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Moral reasoning (MR) is a socio-cognitive skill essential to appropriate social functioning
in childhood, and evolves in quality and complexity during ontogenetic development.
Past research suggests that MR is related to age, socioeconomic factors, as well as
some social and cognitive skills, such as executive functioning (EF), theory of mind
(ToM), empathy, and affect recognition. However, their contributions have been studied
in silos rather than comprehensively, with little integration of the relative and combined
contribution of these skills to MR. Furthermore, few studies have addressed the putative
links between these factors in childhood, a period during which these skills are in
maturation. The aim of this study was to explore what factors predict moral maturity in
typically developing children (n = 76, 47.4% males, M = 9.2, SD = 1.67 years), explore
the potential moderating and mediating role of executive functions and social cognition
in the relationship between age and MR maturity, and identify the specific contributions
of age, socioeconomic factors, EF, and social cognition, using an innovative visual MR
assessment tool (So-Moral). The results indicate that MR maturity was correlated with
age, EF (inhibition, verbal fluency, and attentional control), and social cognition (ToM
and affect recognition). Neither EF nor social cognition moderated the effect of age on
MR maturity. However, verbal fluency and third-order false beliefs had a moderating role
in this link. MR maturity in children was predicted by three variables from each of the
three domains: age, verbal fluency, and third-order ToM. These results contribute to a
better understanding of the underpinnings of MR during childhood, suggesting that MR
is not reducible to general developmental factors such as age, but that higher order
skills, such EF and social cognition also contribute to moral maturity. The findings have
relevance for both typically developing and clinical populations in which social skills may
be reduced, as well as for the identification of potential loci for intervention in children
at-risk for socially maladaptive behaviors.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans, as social beings and moral agents, are faced with making
their first moral decisions much before attaining cognitive,
emotional, and social maturity. In everyday life, children have to
evaluate morally relevant situations in order to make decisions
concerning social behaviors such as fair play, admit their
wrongdoings, participate or not in bullying, and so on, by
using abilities that are not yet consolidated. Current research
demonstrates that children are able to differentiate moral issues
from social conventions and personal choices (Turiel, 2002),
and that their moral understanding increases during ontogenetic
development, presumably growing in parallel with cognitive
abilities and social cognition (Lane et al., 2010). In addition,
some studies suggest that demographic factors such as maternal
education and social risk could influence moral understanding
(Dunn et al., 2000; Arsenio and Gold, 2006; Hinnant et al., 2013).
Thus, moral reasoning (MR) in childhood is likely to
be underpinned by cognitive, socio-cognitive, and affective
capacities in maturation, as well as by demographic factors.
However, whereas past research suggests an association between
MR skills and the development of some social and cognitive
skills, such as executive functioning (EF; Hinnant et al.,
2013), theory of mind (ToM; Baird and Astington, 2004),
empathy (Hoffman, 2000), and affect recognition (Blair et al.,
2001a), their contributions have been studied in silos rather
than comprehensively, with little integration of the relative
and combined contribution of these skills to MR, or the
potential mediation and moderation effects of these skills in
the relationship between age and MR skills. Understanding the
building blocks of MR skills in childhood has relevance for both
typically developing and clinical populations in which social skills
may be reduced.
Moral Reasoning and Socioeconomic
Factors
Broadly, some studies indicate that moral understanding may
be affected by demographic factors, such as socioeconomic
status and social risk in particular (Haidt et al., 1993; Dunn
et al., 2000; Arsenio and Gold, 2006). However, concerning MR
skills specifically, some studies have found a positive link with
socioeconomic status (Cui et al., 2015) and maternal education
(Hinnant et al., 2013), while others have not shown such an
association (Caravita et al., 2012; Malti et al., 2013; Vera-Estay
et al., 2014), including a large-scale longitudinal study from
childhood to early adolescence (Daniel et al., 2014).
Moral Reasoning and Socio-Cognitive
Skills
Social cognition is a broad construct referred to as the human
capacity to think about others’ thoughts, intentions, feelings,
attitudes, and perspectives, enabling us to interact in the social
world (Sharp et al., 2008). MR is a specific component of social
cognition, defined as the thinking mechanism through which
moral judgments about right and wrong are attained (Moll et al.,
2005). Elementary manifestations of MR can be observed as early
as infancy (Malti and Latzko, 2010; Decety et al., 2012), but it is
during early childhood that MR skills begin to be more explicit,
as children interact verbally with peers, siblings and adults,
resolve conflicts and negotiate social situations, leading them
to experience concepts such as reciprocity, fairness, and justice
(Killen and Rutland, 2011). MR skills continue to increase during
middle childhood, supporting prosocial tendencies toward peers
and adults (Miller et al., 1996). According to Social Domain
theory (Turiel, 2002), during this period, children learn to
distinguish and progressively coordinate three main forms
of social knowledge: moral, social, and psychological, adding
flexibility and nuance to their interpretation of the social world.
Moral knowledge related to fairness, justice, welfare and rights,
changes during childhood. Thus, whereas younger children tend
to evaluate moral situations based on concrete concepts of
harm and welfare, older children favor abstract concepts of
justice and rights (Turiel, 2002; Killen and Rutland, 2011). This
evolution is likely influenced by global cognitive development,
in particular by the evolution of high order cognitive skills
such as executive functions (EF), a broad range of skills that
are implicated in regulating thinking and behavior (Kerr and
Zelazo, 2004), and by other socio-cognitive functions developing
in parallel.
In addition to MR, socio-cognitive skills include several
other mental processes used to perceive and process social cues,
stimuli, and environments (Beauchamp and Anderson, 2010).
Research in developmental psychopathology has shown that poor
social functioning may be in part explained by deficits in these
functions (for a review, see Sharp et al., 2008). Considering that
even normal variations in socio-cognitive skills could potentially
translate into inter-individual differences in social functioning,
the current study focused on the associations between MR
skills during childhood and three fundamental aspects of social
cognition: affect recognition, empathy, and ToM.
Affect Recognition
Humans are born with an innate preference for faces (Johnson
and Morton, 1991). They communicate important information
about the emotional state of individuals, which is essential for
accurately interpreting social situations. Facial affect recognition
develops rapidly during infancy and early childhood (Herba et al.,
2006) and continues to evolve during late childhood, adolescence,
and even adulthood (Thomas et al., 2007). The evolution of this
skill appears to be influenced by other neurocognitive abilities,
specifically by EF, as demonstrated in a study of 1000 healthy
individuals (6 to 91 years; Mathersul et al., 2009). Consistent with
these findings, Rosenqvist et al. (2014) found that EF, language,
and ToM skills are significant predictors of children’s affect
recognition.
Recognizing others’ emotions in moral conflicts is likely to
influence MR. Deficits in facial affect recognition are associated
with psychopathy in youth and adult offenders (Hastings et al.,
2008; Bowen et al., 2014), but also in children with psychopathic
tendencies, who appear to be less sensitive to sad and fearful
facial expressions compared to control groups (Blair et al., 2001a;
Stevens et al., 2001), suggesting a link between affect recognition
and morality.
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Empathy
“Empathy is the ability to experience and understand what others
feel without confusion between oneself and others” (Decety and
Lamm, 2006, p. 1146). Empathy is critical to regulating behavior
during social interactions and has been related to prosocial
MR, moral motivation and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg and
Mussen, 1978; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990; Miller et al., 1996;
Roberts and Strayer, 1996; Hoffman, 2000; Eisenberg et al., 2002;
Eisenberg, 2003; Beauchamp et al., 2013). However, research
demonstrates a complex relation between empathy and morality.
Globally, empathy contributes to MR because it informs on the
emotional state of the actors involved in social situations. These
emotional states include victim’s suffering, as well as victimizer
emotional experience toward the moral conflict, which may
prevent the rationalization of moral transgressions. Despite this,
empathic tendencies could also interfere with MR, introducing
in-group bias and justifying immoral behaviors (Decety and
Cowell, 2015). Moreover, given that the general term “empathy”
is used for describing several more specific affective and cognitive
concepts, the relationship between empathy and other cognitive
and behavior variables tends to be blurred (Decety and Cowell,
2014).
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind refers to the cognitive ability that allows
us to understand other people as intentional, perceptive, and
emotional agents, or to interpret their minds in terms of
intentional, perceptual, or feeling states (Moll et al., 2005). ToM
skills involve progressive abilities that enable inference of other’s
mental states at different levels of recursive thinking (first-order
belief, John thinks X; second-order belief, John thinks Mary thinks
X; third-order belief, John thinks what Mary thinks that he thinks
X, and so on), helping to understand the complexity of human
social interactions. However, when we infer others’ mental states,
we must also determine whether they differ from reality or from
our own knowledge about the world, an ability called “false
belief understanding.” First-, second-, and third-order false belief
tasks assess false belief understanding at different levels of ToM
(Korkmaz, 2011).
Whereas first order ToM is generally mastered by healthy
children at around 5 years of age, second and third-order
ToM, as well as false belief understanding, continue to develop
through childhood and adolescence (Liddle and Nattle, 2006;
Dumontheil et al., 2010), supported by the development of
social experience and specific high-level cognitive abilities such
as EF. Thus, according to a meta-analysis conducted by Devine
and Hughes (2014), EF in the preschool years is a significant
predictor of false belief understanding at school-age, and these
findings are consistent across different EF tasks and cultures.
Theoretically, cognitive inhibition is a central mechanism in false
belief understanding, because it requires inhibition of one’s own
knowledge in order to think about other’s mental states (Birch
and Bloom, 2004). ToM and EF are considered to be the cognitive
bases of social perspective-taking (Gibbs, 2013).
There is growing evidence of the association between MR
and ToM skills (Lagattuta, 2005; Wainryb and Brehl, 2006;
Killen et al., 2011; Smetana et al., 2012). ToM is potentially
implicated in the evaluation of moral situations, because it
provides information about the intention and motivation of
others’, two key aspects in the evaluation of moral values (Baird
and Astington, 2004). A cognitive neuroscience study (Young
et al., 2007) confirms this view suggesting that moral judgment
depends on cognitive processes mediated by brain areas related
to belief attribution and ToM. Research in typically developing
children indicates that as children grow, they increasingly
incorporate information about mental states in their moral
evaluations (Cushman et al., 2013). In addition, children who
rely on more advanced ToM, including false belief, have better
moral understanding (Dunn et al., 2000) and more mature MR
(Baird and Astington, 2004), which is consistent with the results
of a longitudinal study conducted by Lane et al. (2010) in which
ToM skills predicted more mature (societally-oriented) MR in
children.
Moral Reasoning and Executive
Functions
As mentioned above, the intense evolution of EF, and in
particular, inhibition, during infancy and early childhood
is associated with the development of socio-cognitive skills
(Barkley, 1997; Beauchamp and Anderson, 2010), with better EF
positively associated with social competence (Kochanska et al.,
2000), ToM (Carlson and Moses, 2001; Devine and Hughes,
2014), and moral understanding (Decety and Howard, 2013).
Moreover, EF has been shown to be a significant predictor
of later social functioning, contributing to social adjustment
and resilience (Eisenberg et al., 2004; Martel et al., 2007;
Miller and Hinshaw, 2010). However, there are few studies
addressing the specific link between EF and MR in childhood
and their results support the need for further investigation.
A recent study in healthy school-aged children demonstrated
that executive skills are positively associated with MR (Hinnant
et al., 2013), consistent with findings in school-aged children
with developmental disabilities and frontal lesions (Couper et al.,
2002; Kretschmer et al., 2014). Recent research also supports
this link in adolescents, in whom more mature MR was found
to be associated with several executive functions (conceptual
reasoning, cognitive flexibility, verbal fluency, and feedback
utilization), with flexibility and verbal fluency independently
predicting MR maturity, after controlling for the effects of
age and intelligence (Vera-Estay et al., 2014). However, these
associations have not been tested in children, nor do we know
how they play out when socio-cognitive skills are considered in
combination.
THE CURRENT STUDY
The present study contributes to developmental socio-
cognitive research by exploring the combined and independent
contributions of age and socioeconomic status, cognitive and
socio-cognitive variables to MR maturity skills using a novel,
developmentally appropriate, visual task. Specifically, the
study aimed to: (1) evaluate the association between MR, age,
socioeconomic variables (family income and parental education),
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EF (attentional control, inhibition, and verbal fluency), and social
cognition (empathy, ToM, and affect recognition); (2) evaluate
whether EF moderates or mediates the relationship between age
and MR skills (3) evaluate whether executive and social cognition
variables mediate or moderate the relationship between age
and MR skills (4) assess the contribution of social cognition
to MR maturity, after controlling for EF and age. In line with
current literature on MR development described above, it was
expected that age, executive and socio-cognitive functions would
be positively correlated with MR maturity. Considering previous
results using the So-Moral task (Vera-Estay et al., 2014), we
expected that socioeconomic variables would not be associated
with MR scores. Regarding moderation and mediation effects,
we expected that EF and social cognition variables would play a
mediating and moderating role in the relationship between age
and MR skills. We also expected that age and EF would predict
MR maturity and specifically, that verbal fluency would have
an independent contribution to MR scores. Concerning social
cognition, on the basis of current literature (Dunn et al., 2000;
Baird and Astington, 2004; Lane et al., 2010; Cushman et al.,
2013) we expected that it would predict MR scores, with ToM
making the largest contribution.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Seventy-six participants between 6 and 12 years (47.4% males,
M = 9.2, SD = 1.67 years) participated in this study. All
participants and their families were French speakers. They
were predominantly Caucasian (95%), had no history of any
psychiatric or neurological condition, had IQ levels in the low
to high average range (87–129, M = 108.6, SD = 9.9) and
were primarily from middle-class families according to their
income (Statistics Canada, 2015). Participants were identified
and recruited through regular primary schools in Quebec,
Canada. All parents provided written informed consent prior
to participation. Participants were compensated $30 for their
participation. The Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of
Arts and Science at the University of Montreal approved the
study.
Measures
To control for order effects in the assessments, two
counterbalancing procedures were applied randomly across
participants: one to the order of the whole testing session, and
one to the order of the dilemmas in the So-Moral task (see
below). The following measures were administered.
Demographic and Developmental Questionnaire
Parents’ of participants completed a questionnaire pertaining to
their child’s medical, developmental, and social history, as well
parents’ education level, ethnicity, and income.
Intellectual Functioning
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI,
Wechsler, 1999) was used to provide an estimate of general
intellectual ability based on the Vocabulary and Matrix
Reasoning subtests (IQ, M = 100, SD= 15).
Theory of Mind
To assess children’s ability to infer other people’s mental states,
the Theory of Mind Picture Stories task (Brune, 2005; Bechi
et al., 2012) was administered. This task consists of six cartoon
picture storied depicted on four cards each. Two are stories in
which two characters cooperate, two are stories in which one
character deceives another, and two stories show two characters
cooperating to deceive a third. The cards are presented face-
down in mixed order; participants are asked to turn the cards
over and to order them in a logical sequence of events. For each
cartoon story sequenced correctly a maximum score of 6 can be
obtained: two points are given each for the first and last correctly
sequenced picture and one point each for the third and fourth
picture. After the children correctly arrange the four cards, they
are asked to answer questions that pertain to the mental states of
the different characters, including questions of first-, second-, and
third-order false beliefs as well as of reciprocity, deception and
cheating detection. For each question answered correctly, one
point is obtained. The variables of interest in this study were first-,
second-, and third-order false belief (scores 0 to 3) and Total ToM
(score 0–59).
Empathy
The Griffith Empathy Measure (GEM, Dadds et al., 2008) is a 23-
item parent-report questionnaire adapted from Bryant’s Index of
Empathy for Children and Adolescents (Bryant, 1982) in which
parents rate the empathetic abilities of their child on a 9-point
Likert scale from –4 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). This
questionnaire provides three scores: Cognitive empathy (score –
56 to 56), Affective empathy (score –68 to 68), and Total empathy
(score –92 to 92), with higher scores corresponding to higher
levels of empathy. Cognitive empathy can be defined as “the
ability to intellectually take the role or perspective of another
person involving the ability to decode and label emotions and
their situational cues” (Dadds et al., 2008, p. 112). Affective
empathy is defined as “an affective response more appropriate
to, or congruent with, someone else’s situation than to one’s own
situation” (Dadds et al., 2008, p. 112). The GEM has adequate
reliability and validity across gender and age (Dadds et al., 2008).
In line with Decety and Cowell (2014), the Affective empathy
score was used as the main measure of empathy, whereas the total
and cognitive scores were used as complementary measures, in
order to distinguish the specific link of each aspect of empathy
with MR skills.
Affect Recognition
The Affect Recognition subtest from the NEPSY-II (Korkman
et al., 2007) assesses children’s ability to recognize affect from
pictures of children’s faces expressing one of five basic emotions
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust) or a neutral expression.
This 35-item task has four conditions increasing in difficulty
(number of distractors; score 0 to 35). The total number of
correct responses was used as the affect recognition variable in
this study.
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Moral Reasoning
The children’s version of the Socio-Moral Reasoning Aptitude
Level task (So-Moral-Child, Dooley et al., 2010; Beauchamp et al.,
2013) is a visual, computer-based task that presents nine moral
dilemmas specifically designed for children and has gender-
specific versions. Each dilemma (see example Figure 1) consists
of an introductory screen presenting the name of the dilemma
(e.g., teacher), three first-person perspective pictures of children
actors playing out various social scenarios representing a conflict
centered on the moral domain (e.g., concerns with justice,
welfare/harm, and rights) according to Social Domain Theory
(Turiel, 1983), and a final screen presenting a dichotomous
decision (e.g., whether or not to engage in a particular action,
such as stealing from a shop, cheating at a game, etc.). The
aggregate number of responses is compiled to obtain a moral
decision-making score, which ranges from 0 to 9 points. Children
are then asked to provide a justification for their decision.
Each participant’s justification is recorded verbatim and scored
using a standardized coding system (Beauchamp and Dooley,
2012) based on the cognitive-developmental approach to MR
(Kohlberg et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983; Gibbs, 2010). The moral
decision-making score does not affect the moral justification
score (both are independent). Developmental stages of MR have
been adapted to fit the social nature of the dilemmas in the
So-Moral task and consist of the following: (1) Centrations
and authoritarian-based consequences; (2) Egocentric/pragmatic
exchanges; (3) Interpersonal Focus; (4) Societal Regulation; and
(5) Societal Evaluation (see Table 1). Transition stages (i.e., 1.5,
2.5, etc.) are used to account for answers that provide elements
of two consecutive reasoning stages. When elements of non-
consecutive stages are provided, the response is coded according
to the highest schema detected. The MR maturity score (0–45
points) is obtained by summing the nine justification scores.
This test has adequate inter-rater reliability and construct validity
(Dooley et al., 2010). Each justification was scored independently
by two trained raters (Intraclass correlation coefficient = 0.81)
and discrepancies were resolved by discussion and consensus.
The MR maturity score was used as the main dependent variable.
Executive Functioning
Two tasks from the NEPSY-II battery (Korkman et al., 2007) and
one task from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children –
Fourth Edition (WISC-IVCDN−F; Wechsler, 2005) were used
to measure three executive functions (attentional control,
inhibition, and verbal fluency).
Attentional control
The WISC-IV Cancellation subtest was used to measure
children’s ability to direct their attention and resist distraction
during a goal-oriented task. Children are asked to detect and
mark objects belonging to the same category (i.e., animals) that
are mixed among distracters, within a specific time limit. The
raw total score of this task was used as the attentional control
variable.
Inhibition
The NEPSY-II Inhibition subtest, an adaptation of the widely
used Stroop task (Stroop, 1935/1992), assesses children’s
inhibition skills by using images (shapes and arrows) instead of
words. In the first condition (Naming), children look at a series
of black and white shapes or arrows must name either the shapes
(circles or squares) or the direction of arrows (up or down) as
quickly as possible. In the second condition (Inhibition), children
must look at the same series of black and white shapes or
arrows, but must quickly name the opposite shapes or direction
of arrow. In the third condition (shifting), children must alternate
the response (same or opposite) depending on the color of the
shape or arrow. The raw completion time score of the inhibition
condition was used as the inhibition variable.
Verbal fluency
The NEPSY-II Word generation subtest was used to assess
participants’ verbal fluency. In this task, children are asked to
produce as many words as possible in 1 min, within a semantic
and a phonetic condition. The raw semantic score was used as
the verbal fluency variable.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 21.0 software and
the PROCESS macro for mediation and moderation analysis
(Hayes, 2012, 2013). Prior to all statistical analyses, data were
examined for any violations of test assumptions (normality,
linearity, and homoscedasticity). Correlation coefficients were
calculated to examine the relationship between MR maturity
and age, socioeconomic variables (family income, parental
education level, and a composite SES score including both
variables), EF variables (attentional control, inhibition, and
verbal fluency) and social cognition (ToM, empathy, and affect
recognition). In order to examine the potential moderating
and mediating effects of EF on the relationship between age
and MR skills, we performed moderation analyses with each
variable individually as potential moderators, and a parallel
FIGURE 1 | Example item from the So-Moral-Child task (Socio-Moral Reasoning Aptitude Level).
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TABLE 1 | Brief description of So-Moral coding and examples.
Level Brief description Example
1 Moral justifications have an egocentric focus, which is based on obedience to higher authorities and
potential consequences of their actions for themselves (e.g., punishment). Thinking at this level is inflexible;
there is only one right/wrong way to act.
• Because I could go to jail.
2 Moral justifications are based on a concept of pragmatic deals or exchanging favours with others (‘fair
deals’). Thinking is more flexible and is determined by context. The correct option is the one that is right for
oneself (self-interest).
• Because I might need his/her help in the
future.
3 Moral justifications have a focus on interpersonal relationships, a sense of ‘good-ness’, and feelings such as
empathy and trust. Decisions are made with good motives and a prosocial perspective of the world.
• Because he/she could get hurt.
4 Moral justifications start to incorporate a broader view of morality; based on the compliance with rules,
regulations and standards that society has established to ensure social order.
• Because if everyone were to be unfaithful,
relationships would not have any meaning.
5 Moral justifications are characterized by the capacity to evaluate situations from various points of view to
identify values involved in the specific situation in order to make the fairest decision. Protection of
fundamental values and people’s rights is specific to this stage, even though these concepts are expressed
very concretely.
• Because people work hard for their things and
we should respect their belongings.
multiple mediation analysis with attentional control, inhibition
and verbal fluency together as mediator variables, using the
PROCESS macro provided by Hayes (2012). To assess the
potential moderating and mediating effect of social cognition
variables (affect recognition and third-order false beliefs, the
ToM variable most correlated with MR) on the association
between age and MR skills, we performed moderation analyses
with each variable individually as a potential moderator, and a
parallel multiple mediation analysis with both variables as a set
of mediators. In mediation analyses, the statistical significance of
the obtained regression coefficients was determined by obtaining
a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval by bootstrapping
based on 1,000 resamples. Finally, a three-step hierarchical
multiple regression analysis was conducted with age in the first
step, the EF most strongly associated with MR (i.e., verbal
fluency) in the second step and social cognition variables
that correlated with MR in the final step, in order to
explore the specific contribution of demographic, cognitive,
and socio-cognitive variables to MR maturity. Socioeconomic
variables were not included in the models because they
were not related to either MR maturity or other measures
used in the study. Results corresponding to p < 0.05 were
considered statistically significant. The strength of correlations
and effect sizes were determined according to Cohen’s (1988)
criteria.
RESULTS
Descriptive Results
Participant demographic characteristics and participants’ results
on socioeconomic, cognitive, and socio-cognitive measures are
presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Association of Moral Reasoning Maturity
with Socioeconomic Factors
Moral reasoning maturity was not related to socioeconomic
variables including family income and maternal and paternal
education level (see Table 3).
Association of Moral Reasoning Maturity
with Age, Executive Functioning, and
Social Cognition
As shown in Table 3, MR maturity was strongly and directly
associated with age (r = 0.54 p < 0.001). In terms of EF,
there was a moderate significant relationship between MR
maturity and inhibition, as well as verbal fluency, and a
small but significant relationship between MR and attentional
control. Concerning social cognition variables, MR maturity was
moderately associated with total ToM and higher order ToM, as
well as with affect recognition, but it was not associated with first-
order false beliefs. Affective empathy, our main empathy variable,
as well as total empathy, were not associated with MR skills, but
cognitive empathy approached significance (r = 0.22 p= 0.054).
Age and Moral Reasoning Maturity: The
Moderating and Mediating Role of EF
Results of the moderation analyses performed using the
PROCESS macro detected no significant interactions of age X
attentional control, (b = –0.0009, 95% CI [–0.0016 –0.0033],
t = 0.7155, p = 0.48); inhibition (b = –0.0001, 95% CI [–
0.0031 –0.0029], t = –0.0671, p = 0.95) and verbal fluency
(b = –0.0014, 95% CI [–0.0068 –0.0040], t = –0.5167, p = 0.61)
on MR maturity, indicating that these EF do not play a
significant moderating role in the relationship between age and
MR maturity.
Table 4 displays the bootstrapped estimates for the total
and specific indirect effects obtained from multiple mediation
analysis. The total indirect effect of age on MR skills through EF
variables as a group was not statistically significant, as the 95%
confidence intervals contained zero. Considering the possibility
of having significant specific indirect effects in the absence of a
significant total indirect effect (Preacher and Hayes, 2008), we
evaluated the specific indirect effects associated with each of the
three mediators, detecting a significant mediating role for verbal
fluency on the link between age and MR skills. To assess the
effect size of verbal fluency as a mediator, we performed a simple
mediator model. The indirect effect of verbal fluency obtained
was statistically significant (b= 0.041, 95% CI [0.0013 0.0890]), as
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TABLE 2 | Sociodemographic characteristics of the participants.
Variable Frequency %
Gender
Male 36 52.6
Female 40 47.4
Ethnic origin
White 72 94.7
Hispanic 2 2.6
African–American 2 2.6
Total gross annual household income (CAN $)
Below 20 000 $ 4 5.3
20 000 through 39 000 $ 12 15.8
40 000 through 59 000 $ 17 22.4
60 000 through 79 000 $ 22 28.9
80 000 through 99 000 $ 16 21.1
100 000 $ and more 5 6.6
SES on the basis of the annual household income1
High SES 5 6.6
Middle SES 54 72.4
Low SES 16 21.1
Maternal education
Master’s degree 1 1.3
Bachelor’s degree 10 13.2
College 29 38.2
High school graduate 28 36.8
Incomplete high school 8 10.5
Paternal education
Doctoral degree 1 1.3
Master’s degree 2 2.6
Bachelor’s degree 4 5.3
College 15 19.7
High school graduate 35 46.1
Incomplete high school 16 21.1
Missing values 3 3.9
1 Statistics Canada, 2015.
the confidence intervals do not contain zero. The Kelley–Kappa
squared obtained (κ2; Hayes, 2013) indicates an effect size of 0.15,
which is considered a medium effect according to Preacher and
Kelley (2011), based on Cohen’s (1988) criteria.
Age and Moral Reasoning Maturity: The
Moderating and Mediating Role of Social
Cognition
Results of the moderation analyses also detected non-significant
interactions of age X Third-order false beliefs (b = –0.0483,
95% CI [–0.1080 –0.0114], t = –1.6131, p = 0.11) and affect
recognition (b = –0.0011, 95% CI [–0.0089 –0.0111], t = 0.2141,
p = 0.83) on MR maturity, indicating that social cognition
variables do not moderate the relationship between age and
MR maturity. Table 4 displays the bootstrapped estimates for
the total and specific indirect effects obtained from multiple
mediation analysis. The total indirect effect of age on MR skills
through third-order false beliefs and affect recognition as a set
was statistically significant, as the confidence intervals do not
contain zero. The specific indirect effect of each variable was
evaluated, detecting a significant mediating role of third-order
false beliefs on the link between age and MR skills. The effect size
of third-order beliefs as mediators was also assessed performing a
simple mediator model. The results indicate a significant indirect
effect (b= 0.0224, 95% CI [0.0041 –0.0571]) with a medium effect
size (κ2 = 0.09).
Contribution of Demographic, EF, and
Socio-Cognitive Variables to Moral
Reasoning Maturity
As shown in Table 5, a three-level hierarchical multiple regression
indicates that in Step 1, age contributed significantly to the
regression model, F(1,73) = 28.129, p < 0.001 and accounted
for 28% of the variation in MR maturity, with a large effect size
(f 2 = 0.37). Introducing verbal fluency to the model explained
an additional 5% of variation in MR scores and the change in R2
was significant, F change (1,72)= 5.571, p= 0.021. Together, age
and verbal fluency explained 33% of MR scores (F(2,72)= 17.731,
p < 0.001), which corresponds to a large effect (f 2 = 0.49).
Finally, the addition of social cognition variables (third-order
false beliefs and affect recognition) to the regression model
explained an additional 6% of the variation in MR maturity and
the change in R2 was also significant, F(2,70) = 3.426, p = 0.038.
Together, age, verbal fluency, third-order false beliefs and affect
recognition explained 39% of MR scores [F(4,70) = 11.176,
p < 0.001], which corresponds to a large effect (f 2 = 0.64).
When social cognition variables were included in step 3 of the
regression model, verbal fluency (β= 0.24, 0.041) and third-order
false beliefs (β = 0.22, p = 0.030) were significant, independent
predictors of MR maturity.
DISCUSSION
This study explored the relationship between demographic
factors, EF, social cognition, and children’s moral maturity, as well
as the independent and combined contribution of these variables
to MR.
While several studies have found a link between demographic
factors, such as maternal education and SES, and moral processes
(Dunn et al., 2000; Arsenio and Gold, 2006; Hinnant et al.,
2013), others have not reported such an association (Caravita
et al., 2012; Vera-Estay et al., 2014). In the current study,
neither the SES composite z-score, nor parental education and
income individually were associated with children’ MR skills.
This discrepancy in results may be due to population differences
and the relatively high-level of SES in the current sample and
absence of any real social risk. Despite adequate variability in
family income in our sample, 98% of the mothers of participants
had at least some high school education, possibly off-setting
the adverse effects of low SES, and contrasting with studies
in extremely disadvantaged children (e.g., Arsenio and Gold,
2006). In addition, methodological differences could contribute
to explaining the lack of association between SES and MR in this
study. Parental education is known to be linked to child academic
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TABLE 3 | Main descriptive results and correlations of the study.
Variable M SD Correlation
MR maturity Age SES composite
Age in months 0.54∗∗∗ 1 − 0.02
Socioeconomic variables
SES composite z-score − 0.03 0.75 − 0.13 − 0.02 1
Annual Household income z-score 0 1 − 0.13 − 0.05 0.73∗∗∗
Maternal education z-score 0 1 − 0.09 0.08 0.74∗∗
Paternal education z-score 0 1 − 0.04 − 0.11 0.61∗∗∗
Cognitive variables
Intellectual functioning (WASI IQ) 108.6 9.9 0.17 0.16 0.03
Attentional controla 82.5 21.1 0.36∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.05
Verbal fluencyb 30.3 9.3 0.49∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ − 0.19
Inhibitionc 74.9 26.0 − 0.43∗∗∗ − 0.66∗∗∗
Socio-cognitive variables
Affect recognitiond 25.1 4.6 0.42∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ − 0.22
Empathy (total score)e 33.2 23.4 0.21 0.34∗∗ − 0.09
Cognitive empathyf 25.5 14.2 0.22 0.32∗∗ − 0.10
Affective empathyg 23.8 18.8 0.19 0.29∗ − 0.07
Theory of Mindh 48.7 7.8 0.32∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ − 0.08
First-order false beliefsi 2.7 0.6 0.11 0.27∗ − 0.05
Second-order false beliefsj 2.1 0.9 0.26∗ 0.40∗∗ − 0.08
Third-order false beliefsk 1.9 1.0 0.40∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗ − 0.03
Moral reasoningl 18.3 5.3 0.56 − 0.13
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. aWISC-IV Cancelation raw total score; bNEPSY-II Word generation raw semantic score; cNEPSY-II Inhibition raw completion
time score; dNEPSY-II Affect Recognition raw total score; eGriffith Empathy Measure total score; fGriffith Empathy Measure Cognitive empathy score; gGriffith Empathy
Measure Affective empathy score; hTheory of Mind Picture Stories total score; iTheory of Mind Picture Stories First-order false beliefs score; jTheory of Mind Picture
Stories task Second-order false beliefs score; kTheory of Mind Picture Stories task Third-order false beliefs score; lSo-Moral, total justification score.
competence, including reading and writing skills (Bradley and
Corwyn, 2002; Janus and Duku, 2007; Hooper et al., 2010), yet
the So-Moral task was specifically designed to remove the need
for reading and writing for successful performance (Dooley et al.,
2010), therefore potentially eliminating the association between
parental education and MR. Further studies with a larger sample
and greater SES and social risk variability may be necessary to
clarify the exact role of parental education and SES on MR.
On the other hand, consistent with cognitive-developmental
theories (Gibbs, 2013) and recent studies combining
neurophysiological and behavioral measures (Decety et al., 2012),
the current results confirm the positive association between age
and MR skills suggesting an evolution of these during the
transitional period from childhood to pre-adolescence, in
line with the results obtained in our study with early to late
adolescents using the So-Moral task (Vera-Estay et al., 2014).
This developmental tendency may be explained by differences
in biological and cognitive maturity, but also by increased
social experience and opportunities for social perspective taking.
During the school years, children participate actively in the
construction of social relationships and learn to adjust their
behavior in order to be integrated in the community, especially in
peer groups. With age, children learn to integrate and coordinate
social and moral knowledge (Killen and Rutland, 2011), but this
progressive process is influenced by the control of egocentric
bias in order to consider other’s perspectives (Gibbs, 2013). In
our study, younger children tended to justify moral decisions
on the basis of egocentric and concrete reasons such as obeying
authority (e.g., parents, teacher), avoiding punishment, and
obtaining direct personal benefits, whereas older children more
frequently incorporated a socio-centric focus in their reasoning,
including aspects such as empathy toward the victim, caring
and maintaining interpersonal relationship, and more abstract
concepts such as mutual respect, reciprocity, and responsibility.
Despite the age-related tendency of MR skills in typically
developing children, age alone was not sufficient to explain
individual differences in MR. We therefore explored associations
with other cognitive and socio-emotional factors in order to shed
light on the building blocks of MR.
Moral Reasoning and Executive
Functioning
Concerning the cognitive factors related to MR skills, three
aspects of EF (attentional control, inhibition, and verbal fluency)
had a small to moderate association with MR skills, with verbal
fluency having the strongest association. Globally, these results
are in line with previous research investigating the contribution
of EF to social adaptation (Kochanska et al., 2000; Eisenberg
et al., 2004; Martel et al., 2007; Beauchamp and Anderson, 2010;
Miller and Hinshaw, 2010) and moral understanding (Decety and
Howard, 2013), as well as with our previous study which found a
positive link between MR and several EF (conceptual reasoning,
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TABLE 4 | Indirect effects of age on MR skills via EF and social cognition.
Mediator Bootstrap
estimate
SE BC 95%
CI lower
BC 95%
CI upper
Model 1 EF
Attention control –0.0079 0.0212 –0.0498 0.0352
Inhibition 0.0148 0.0250 –0.0336 0.0638
Verbal fluency 0.0336 0.0216 0.0030 0.0887
Total indirect effect 0.0465 0.0299 –0.0148 0.1075
Model 2 social cognition
Affect recognition 0.0272 0.0146 –0.0043 0.0560
Third-order false beliefs 0.0223 0.0131 0.0044 0.0574
Total indirect effect 0.0485 0.0179 0.0195 0.0923
Based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. BC, bias corrected; CI, confidence interval.
TABLE 5 | Contribution of demographic variables, EF, and social cognition
to moral reasoning maturity.
Predictor MR Maturity
1R2 β
Step 1 0.28∗∗∗
Age 0.53∗∗∗
Step 2 0.05∗
Age 0.37∗
Verbal fluency 0.28∗
Step 3 0.06∗
Age 0.23
Verbal fluency 0.24∗
Affect recognition 0.16
Third-order false beliefs 0.22∗
Total R2 0.39∗
n 76
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
cognitive flexibility, verbal fluency, and feedback utilization), in
addition to the independent contribution of cognitive flexibility
and verbal fluency to MR maturity (Vera-Estay et al., 2014).
The relationship between attentional control and MR skills
highlights the importance of directing, focusing and maintaining
attention on relevant stimuli during social situations. Whereas
paying attention to social clues is considered the first step in
social understanding according to Crick and Dodge’s (1994)
Social Information Processing Model, this result suggests that
this skill is also specifically related to better MR. Thus, detecting
the relevant information contained in the So-Moral task (as in
everyday life) requires individuals to focus on the story, control
environmental, and internal distractors, and pay attention to
subtle visual details, in order to accurately interpret the situation
that will then be evaluated according to moral processes.
Inhibition skills were also related to more mature MR. This
result is consistent with Barkley’s (1997) established ADHD
model, which depicts inhibition as a pivotal skill for adequate
self-regulation and social adaptation, one which sustains high
order socio-cognitive processes, such as social perspective taking,
internalization of speech and MR. In the same vein, Birch and
Bloom (2004) have underscored the role of inhibition in cognitive
perspective taking, specifically false belief understanding, since
it requires the capacity to control and suspend automatized
subjective points of view, in order to think about other’s
mental states and knowledge. During MR, inhibiting one’s own
point of view in favor of taking another’s perspective could
enable people to distinguish between intentional and involuntary
harm, or suspend the analysis of personal benefits/costs in a
moral decision in order to evaluate the potential effects of
these decisions on other people. Besides, inhibition skills work
together with attentional control during the encoding step of the
Social Information Processing Model, helping to control for the
influence of distractive or irrelevant stimuli and stop disruptive
behaviors, in order to focus on significant social and moral
cues. Of note, the finding of a significant association between
attentional/inhibitory skills and moral maturity suggests that
future work should investigate the quality of MR in children
presenting deficits in these areas, such as those with ADHD.
The influence of inhibition on internalization of speech, verbal
fluency, and MR proposed by Barkley (1997) is also consistent
with our finding concerning the positive link between verbal
fluency and MR skills. Indeed, the ability to rapidly access
vocabulary may favor inner speech fluency and consequently
the MR process, considered as an inner moral dialog in which
social situations are evaluated in light of moral criteria (Tappan,
1997). Discussions of moral issues with peers (Berkowitz and
Gibbs, 1983; Walker et al., 2000) and parents (Walker and Taylor,
1991; Walker et al., 2000) have been shown to be pivotal in MR
development, further underscoring the importance of fluid verbal
skills. Therefore, besides the potential influence of verbal fluency
on the internal MR process, this EF may also support the exercise
of MR skills in social contexts fostering active participation in
moral dialogs and debate with others.
Moral Reasoning and Socio-Cognitive
Skills
This study also investigated the relationship between MR and
three important socio-cognitive skills in maturation during
childhood: affect recognition, empathy, and ToM.
Facial emotional expressions are powerful clues for an
adequate understanding of moral situations, since they inform
the internal affective state of the actors involved. However,
traditional written MR tasks do not offer this basic source
of information. Taking to account this limitation, our study
measured MR with a visual task including pictures or real child
actors in which facial emotional expressions reflect the moral
situation played out, and included an affect recognition task
developed for the pediatric population. Using this approach,
we found that children who are better at recognizing emotions
had more mature levels of MR, confirming the importance of
emotional information for a deeper comprehension of moral
issues. This result is consistent with previous research relating
deficits in facial affect recognition with psychopathy in youth
and adult offenders (Hastings et al., 2008; Bowen et al., 2014),
as well as in children with psychopathic tendencies (Blair et al.,
2001a; Stevens et al., 2001). Along with the association of MR
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with both attentional control and inhibition skills, the link
between affect recognition and MR skills is a novel and interesting
finding that highlights the role of encoding cues on high-order
social cognition, namely, MR skills. While attentional control
and inhibition support the encoding process, facial emotional
expressions play the role of content or relevant clue to be
encoded. The aptitude to distinguish these emotions fosters the
second step of social information processing (Crick and Dodge,
1994), i.e., the interpretation of the encoded cues, providing rich
information to infer more complex mental states to the actors
involved in a given social situation (e.g., he is sad to have been
rejected by a friend).
Contrary to our hypothesis, children’s affective empathy, as
reported by their parents, was not related to their MR skills.
While unexpected, this result is, however, in keeping with Decety
and Cowell (2015)’s claims that empathy does not always lead to
moral behavior and could sometimes affect the objectivity of MR.
In children, affective empathy may, for instance, push them to
protect a child from being bullied, but may also induce in-group
bias justifying immoral behaviors in order to protect or help
friends, interfering in the analysis of the consequences on other
actors in the situation. The impact of in-group bias in children’s
moral evaluations has also been demonstrated in a recent study
of children aged 3–9 years, who considered within-group harm
as wrong regardless of explicit rules, but between-group harm
as wrong when explicit rules are present (Rhodes and Chalik,
2013). Thus, mature MR skills may help children to analyze
the situation and expand their concern beyond spontaneous and
evolutionarily older mechanisms such as kin-care and in-group
bias, to humanity as a whole. Perspective-taking skills have a
key role in reducing group partiality and upholding the global
application of moral values (Decety and Cowell, 2015).
In line with this view, our study also found that ToM skills, in
general, as well as higher-order levels of false belief understanding
are associated with better MR skills. However, whereas basic
understanding of other’s minds (first-order false beliefs) was not
associated with MR, more complex understanding represented
by second-order and third-order false beliefs (e.g., “What does
the boy expect the girl thinks he wants to do?”) was related to
better MR skills in childhood. Third-order false beliefs support
theoretical reasoning about intentions, lies, cheating, deception,
and so on. Hence, along with affect recognition, third-order false
belief theoretically contribute to MR processing in the second
step of social information processing (Crick and Dodge, 1994),
sustaining the interpretation of cues in order to evaluate the
moral situation, in addition to being the cognitive basis of social
perspective taking.
Age and Moral Reasoning Maturity: The
Moderating and Mediating Role of EF
and Social Cognition
As described above, while the association between age and MR
maturity has been documented theoretically and empirically
(Decety et al., 2012; Gibbs, 2013), the multiple factors influencing
this developmental trend continue to be explored. The second
and third aims of this study were to investigate to what extent the
link between age and MR maturity was moderated or mediated
by EF and social cognition. According to our results and contrary
to our hypothesis, neither EF nor social cognition variables
moderated the effect of age on MR maturity. This result suggests
that, in healthy children, variations in EF and social cognition do
not affect the magnitude of the relationship between age and MR
skills. Further research including children with EF and/or social
cognition deficits are necessary to determine the generalizability
of the results. On the other hand, verbal fluency and third-
order false beliefs had a moderating role in this link, in line
with cognitive-developmental views of MR, suggesting that the
development of specific thinking processes related to internal
speech and perspective taking help to explain the increase in
moral maturity with age.
In light of growing societal concern regarding the
consequences of children’s behaviors, such as bullying and
peer exclusion, for both victims and victimizers, it is necessary
to create effective strategies to foster appropriate MR skills
at an early age. Understanding the mediators of the effect
of age on MR contributes to this challenge and provides a
starting point for developing targeted intervention programs
for the improvement of social skills in both typically developing
and clinical populations. The results obtained here provide
direction for such programs, particularly considering that both
verbal fluency and ToM have the potential to be targeted in
socio-cognitive intervention programs.
Combined Contributions of
Demographic, Executive Functioning,
and Social Cognition to Moral Reasoning
The fourth aim of this study was to investigate the relative
and combined contributions of age, EF, and socio-cognitive
variables to children’s MR skills. To enhance power, the three-step
hierarchical regression conducted included the variables most
correlated with MR skills (i.e., age, verbal fluency, third-order
false beliefs, and affect recognition).
Together these factors explained 39% of the variation in
children’s MR skills, each domain making an independent
contribution. As expected in a sample of healthy children, the
contribution of age (introduced in first step) had a large effect
on MR scores, supporting the cognitive-developmental approach
of morality (Gibbs, 2013) and in line with studies demonstrating
that developmental disorders may interfere with this age trend
(Anderson et al., 1999; Blair et al., 2001b; Couper et al., 2002;
Dooley et al., 2010; Beauchamp et al., 2013). The addition of
verbal fluency (added in the second step) had a small but
significant independent contribution to MR scores, as well as
third-order false beliefs and affect recognition (added in the
third step). In the final model, children’s verbal fluency and their
ability to understand third-order false beliefs were independent
predictors of MR maturity. The current study indicates that
these two skills, theoretically at the core of MR, are not only
associated with MR skills, but also serve as cognitive predictors
in healthy children, suggesting that subtle variations in these
skills may have an impact on the MR process. Considering that
EF and social cognition are impaired in several developmental
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disorders of childhood affecting social understanding, such as
autism spectrum disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (Korkmaz, 2011), this study provides strong support for
investigating MR processes in such groups.
Strengths and Limitations
This study provides novel information about the contribution of
socio-cognitive building blocks of children’s MR skills, on the
basis of the results of an ecological approach to the measurement
of MR for pediatric populations. Our sample has an adequate
balance concerning the sex and age of the participants, which
enhances generalization of the results. Moreover, the results
obtained with healthy children shed light on potential loci
of intervention for children at-risk for socially maladaptive
behaviors. However, the present study has some limitations that
need to be taken into account. First, MR is a higher-order
human skill influenced by multiple interactive factors. Many of
these were taken into account here in one of the few studies to
explore their combined contribution; however, a modest sample
size limited inclusion of additional environmental, cultural,
and individual variables (including other EF) that could also
contribute to MR. These could be explored in a larger sample,
with more variability in terms of maternal education, SES and
ethnicity, in order to build an even more comprehensive view
of moral development. Although a strength of the study was
that it relied on direct neuropsychological measures, empathy
was assessed using a parent-report questionnaire, which may
have introduced bias. Direct observations of children’ empathetic
skills/behaviors could better estimate their relationship with MR.
Finally, whereas our study observed age differences in MR skills
in a cross-sectional design, further studies using a longitudinal
design could more accurately explore the progression of MR
during childhood and infer causal relationships between the
variables explored.
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